Evidence - Privilege Against Disclosure of Identities of Informers by Hardeman, Thomas D.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1954-1955 Term
February 1956
Evidence - Privilege Against Disclosure of Identities
of Informers
Thomas D. Hardeman
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas D. Hardeman, Evidence - Privilege Against Disclosure of Identities of Informers, 16 La. L. Rev. (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss2/30
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
does pads a law on the subject, it then becomes the duty of the
court to determine whether that law is in harmony with or
repugnant to the constitutional provision.13 It is suggested that
the real issue in the instant case was whether or not the con-
stitutional mandate that the Legislature shall pass laws sup-
pressing gambling carries with it the negative implication that
they shall not pass laws permitting it. In their dissenting opin-
ions Justices Hawthorne 14 and Hamiter" took the latter posi-
tion in contending that any law permitting, licensing, or legal-
izing gambling is unconstitutional as violative of the mandate.
However, the majority of the court was unwilling to decide this
issue, and delegated to the Legislature the right of determining
the effect of the mandate. 16 It is submitted that this abdication
to the Legislature of the court's function of determining the
meaning and scope of the Constitution is a refusal on the part of
the Supreme Court to accept its duty of determining the validity
of statutes by comparing them with the applicable provisions of
the Constitution.
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF
IDENTITIES OF INFORMERS
Defendant, chief investigator of a committee created by the
New Orleans Commission Council to investigate the police de-
partment of that city, was asked by a grand jury to disclose the
names of certain informers whom he had identified by numbers
and fictitious names in a report to it. Defendant refused to re-
veal the names, claiming that since the information was given
to him contingent on full assurance to the informers that their
names would not be disclosed, he was privileged to refuse to
name them. He relied in part on a policy memorandum of the
committee which authorized the withholding of names of in-
formers where to do so would not critically hamper the com-
mittee's work. Upon direction by the trial court to identify the
informers, he was adjudged guilty of contempt for refusal to do
13. State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 821, 94 So. 408 (1922), held that La. Acts
1920, No. 127, p. 185, defining what betting on horse races was criminal, was not
a special law in violation of LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
14. Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 227 La. 45, 80, 78 So.2d
504, 514 (1954).
15. Id. at 74, 78 So.2d at 517.
16. Id. at 71, 78 So.2d at 515.
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so. On appeal, held, affirmed. The ordinance creating the com-
mittee specifically requires that reports be made to the grand
jury and full compliance with the ordinance requires the dis-
closure of the names of the informers. Furthermore, privileges
are usually granted by the Legislature and any grant to persons
not provided for by law should be rejected. In re Kohn, 227 La.
245, 79 So.2d 81 (1955).1
The instant decision represents the first time that the Lou-
isiana court has ruled on the applicability in this state of the
privilege against disclosure of the identities of informers. At
common law it is well settled that certain governmental officials
cannot be compelled to disclose the identity of an informer unless
it appears essential to a proper disposition of justice.2 The
privilege runs in favor of the government and may be invoked
on its behalf by governmental officials who are called upon as
witnesses to disclose the information given by the informers.3
It may also be claimed by the person charged with being the in-
former.4 The rationale-of the privilege is that persons should
be encouraged to communicate to the proper officials any infor-
mation they may have regarding the commission of a crime or
the identity of a criminalA One authority has appropriately
noted that "informers are shy and timorous folk, and if their
names are subject to be readily revealed, this source of informa-
tion would be almost cut off." The privilege is usually restricted
to cases in which the governmental official who receives the in-
formation is one engaged in the detection of crime or the prose-
1. Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, 76 Sup. Ct.
196 (1955).
2. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Cannon v. United States,
158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946) ; United States v, Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d
Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Brotlik, 119 F. Supp. 425 (M.D. Pa. 1954) ; People
v. Aste, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). See Annots., 9 A.L.R. 1099, 1112
(1920), 59 A.L.R. 1555, 1559 (1929) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 633, § 332
(4th ed. 1935) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 752, § 2374 (3d ed. 1940). It is generally
held that the privilege relates only to the identify of the informer and not to the
content of the information which he divulges. Granger v. Warrington, 8 Ill. 299(1846) ; State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 132 Pac. 982, 9 A.L.R. 1091 (1913) ; Com-
monwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 165 N.E. 467 (1928); 8 WIOMoRE, Evi-
DENCE 753, § 2374 (3d ed. 1940). But see Vogel v. Gruoz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884)
Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
3. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) ; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390
(3d Cir. 1932) ; State v. Iloben, 36 Utah 36, 102 Pac. 1000 (1909).
4. Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872) ; Welk v. Toogood, 165
Mich. 677, 131 N.W. 124 (1911).
5. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) ; Webb v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 833,
120 S.E. 155 (1923) ; UNDERIILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 633, § 332 (4th ed. 1935);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 752, § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
6. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 309, § 148 (1954).
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cution of criminals.7 However, it may also be granted to ad-
ministrative officials having an investigative duty.8 It applies
in fact, "wherever the situation is one which without this en-
couragement the citizens who have special information of a vio-
lation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily re-
porting it to the appropriate official." (Emphasis added.) No
authority has been found concerning the applicability of the priv-
ilege in grand jury proceedings.
In the instant case the court in the majority opinion, in deny-
ing defendant's assertion of the privilege, stated that it would
not permit the memorandum authorizing the use of the privilege
before the committee to serve as a basis for asserting the priv-
ilege before the grand jury; to do so would be to recognize the
committee as being superior to the grand jury. The court re-
lied upon a section of the ordinance which created the commit-
tee, providing that reports would be made to the Orleans Parish
Grand Jury. It found that an exclusion of the identities of the
informers would render the reports incomprehensible or useless
and thereby violate the terms of the ordinance. It further found
that the promises made by defendant to his informers could not
serve as a basis for the privilege, because to permit such would
give third persons the power to grant privileges. The court
stated that privileges are "usually provided for by the Legisla-
ture,"10 thereby implying that since the Legislature has granted
no privilege against disclosure of the names of informers, none
exists. It is submitted that the court did not give proper treat-
ment to the accepted theory underlying the privilege.
As indicated, the privilege at common law exists solely on
the basis of a "public policy"" that informers should remain
anonymous unless the proper administration of justice demands
otherwise. It is not dependent upon statutory authority or
promises made to informers, but is part of the common law of
evidence.12 In Louisiana, in the absence of express law on the
subject, the common law rules of evidence apply in criminal pro-
7. 8 WIoMORE, EVIDNcE 756, § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. In re Kohn, 227 La. 245, 256, 79 So.2d 81, 85 (1955).
11. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Cannon v. United States,
158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946).
12. People v. Mooney, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
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ceedings. 13 There is no apparent reason why the privilege against
disclosure of the names of informers should not receive similar
treatment.1 4 That the situation presented in the instant case
was a proper one for application of the privilege appears evident
from the facts of the case. Defendant was a municipal official
engaged in the detection of crime and was the appropriate of-
ficial to whom the informers should have related their confi-
dential information. 15 The fact that defendant was appearing
before a grand jury, and not before a court, should have made
no difference, because the privilege should be held applicable
"wherever" 6 the situation demands it. If the court did not be-
lieve that the identities of the informers should have remained
anonymous, it could have denied defendant the right t6 exercise
the privilege without denying its general application. As already
stated, the privilege is applicable unless the proper administra-
tion of justice demands otherwise. As such the trial judge is
granted discretionary powers to determine whether or not he
will sustain a plea of privilege. If in his estimation obtaining
the names of the informers is vital to a proper disposition of
justice, his course of action should be the denial of the privilege.
The role of the appellate court in such instances is to deter-
mine whether or not these discretionary powers were exercised
arbitrarily. It is submitted that the court's holding should be
restricted to the facts of the instant case and that the result
should not be to exclude the privilege against disclosure in this
state. Legislation specifically providing for the privilege in Lou-
isiana appears desirable.
Thomas D. Hardeman
13. LA. R.S. 15:2 (1950) : "In matters of criminal procedure where there is
no express law the common law rules of procedure shall prevail." See State v. Bat-
son, 108 La. 479, 32 So. 478 (1902), holding that in criminal proceedings, in the
absence of Louisiana law, the common law rules of evidence should be applied.
14. Although apparently not intending the statement to have application in the
instant case, the court's view as to the desirability of the privilege was expressed
as follows: "We do believe, as a matter of universal experience, that a shielded
informer or witness will not make men more honest nor more likely to tell the
truth, but will sometimes make them resort to dishonest means to accomplish what
they pretend to be their honest objectives." In re Kohn, 227 La. 245, 250, 79 So.2d
81, 83 (1955). But see quotation page 441 8upra. See also Original Brief on Be-
half of Aaron M. Kohn, Applicant and Relator in Support of Application, pp. 6,
21, where reference is made to the testimony of veteran policemen that the priv-
ilege has been used in actual practice.
15. See Justice Hamiter's dissent in the instant case in which he stated that
defendant was the proper official and that the privilege should have been sustained.
In re Kohn, 227 La. 245, 258, 79 So.2d 81, 86 (1955).
16. See page 442 supra.
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